People and work · Skills
Skills That Fade When the Machine Does Them
When a tool does the effortful part of a task, people perform better with it and can perform worse without it. The skill that fades is often the one needed to notice when the tool is wrong, and the decline sends no signal until something fails. Which skills to protect, and how to keep them.
In a 2023 experiment, 27 radiologists read 50 mammograms, each with a suggestion from what they were told was an AI system. On most cases the suggestion was right, and readers at every level of experience rated about 80 percent of those cases correctly.
On 12 of the mammograms, the suggestion was deliberately wrong. Accuracy collapsed. The least experienced readers got about one in five right. The most experienced did better, 46 percent, but even they were pulled toward the wrong answer more often than not.
Two things are going on there, and both matter for anyone putting AI into skilled work. People defer to a confident suggestion, even when they're experts. And the thing that protects them, independent skill, is exactly what a tool that's usually right slowly stops exercising.
When a tool does the effortful part of a task, people get better with it and can get worse without it. The skill that fades is often the one needed to notice when the tool is wrong. And the decline makes no noise: the person's numbers improve while their judgment weakens. So the skills that matter have to be chosen, practiced on a schedule and measured on purpose, because the job no longer does it for you.
Doing well and learning are different things
The psychologists Elizabeth and Robert Bjork describe two quantities that feel like one. Retrieval strength is how easily you can produce something right now. Storage strength is how deeply you've learned it. Performance during a task reflects the first. Lasting skill is the second.
The two can move in opposite directions. Conditions that make practice feel harder, like spacing it out, mixing problem types, or having to produce an answer rather than recognize one, slow you down in the moment and build more durable learning. The Bjorks call them desirable difficulties.
A capable AI tool removes difficulty, the desirable kind along with the rest. It drafts, so you don't generate. It retrieves, so you don't recall. Work done with the tool feels fluent, goes faster, and leaves less behind.
The cleanest evidence comes from a classroom. In a randomized trial with nearly 1,000 Turkish high school students, math classes practiced either with textbooks, with a GPT-4 chat interface like ChatGPT, or with a GPT-4 tutor instructed to give hints rather than answers. With the plain chatbot, practice scores rose 48 percent. On the exam afterwards, without any tool, those students scored 17 percent lower than students who had never had access. The chat logs showed why: they mostly asked for the answer and copied it. The hint-giving tutor raised practice scores even more and left exam scores about where they were. Students in neither group felt they'd learned less.
Same model. Told to leave the generating to the student, it did no harm.
The irony of supervising a good machine
In 1983 Lisanne Bainbridge wrote a short paper called "Ironies of Automation" about operators of automated industrial plants. Its central irony fits AI almost word for word.
Automation is brought in because it does the job better than the person. The person is then asked to monitor it and take over when it fails. But taking over requires the very skills the automation stopped exercising, in a situation harder than usual, because something has already gone wrong. And monitoring requires knowing what correct behavior looks like, which is the same knowledge. Her conclusion runs against intuition: the most reliable automated systems may need the greatest investment in training the people who supervise them.
The skill a tool stops exercising is often the skill needed to notice the tool is wrong.
Pilots show what fades first. In a 2014 study, 16 airline pilots who rely on automation for most of every flight flew scenarios by hand in a 747 simulator. Their stick-and-rudder skills were mostly intact. What had degraded was the mental work: tracking where the aircraft was without a map display, knowing which navigation step came next, recognizing instrument failures. Performance on those tasks went with how often pilots said their minds wandered while the autopilot flew. The hands remembered. The judgment that interprets a situation faded when nothing demanded it, and supervision runs on that judgment.
Add the pull of a confident suggestion, called automation bias, and you have two problems stacked: people defer to the tool, and over time their own ability to see its errors erodes.
Three ways a skill goes missing
Three different things get called deskilling, and they need different responses.
Deskilling in the strict sense is losing a skill you had, like the pilot who hand-flew for years and now mostly monitors. Something remains, so practice can rebuild it.
Never-skilling is not building the skill in the first place. A junior analyst whose first drafts come from a model skips the repetitions that would have taught her. Bainbridge saw this coming too, warning that operators were "riding on their skills, which later generations of operators cannot be expected to have." There's no earlier level to compare against, so it's invisible, and it shows up years later as people who look experienced on paper. The tasks automated first tend to be the ones juniors used to learn on (A Job Is a Bundle of Tasks).
Skill shift is the benign version: the skill moves somewhere else that matters, as calculators moved school arithmetic toward estimation and setting up the problem. Knowledge workers surveyed by Microsoft Research and Carnegie Mellon described this with generative AI, their critical thinking moving from producing material toward verifying and integrating it. A shift is a good outcome only if the new skill is enough for the job, including the part that happens when the tool fails.
The decline nobody sees
Here's why this is a management problem and not only a training one. A simple model shows how it could play out for one person. The parameters are plausible assumptions, not data.
A reviewer checks AI-drafted documents. Before the tool, she wrote similar documents herself every day. Now the AI drafts, she reviews, and she writes one herself about once a month. About two subtle errors a week reach her, the kind only someone who knows how to write the document well would catch. Her skill decays slowly without practice and is rebuilt a little by each document she drafts herself.
Guess first
A reviewer who drafts documents daily catches about 75 percent of subtle errors. If she drafts only about once a month, roughly what share will she catch after two years?
Drafting daily, she catches about 75 percent of those subtle errors. Drafting monthly, her catch rate falls to 54 percent after six months and about 42 percent after two years. In her second year she misses about 59 of the 104 subtle errors that pass through her hands, more than twice as many as when she drafted daily.
Add one deliberate practice session a week, drafting a document independently and then comparing it with the AI's version and an expert's notes, and her catch rate settles around 70 percent. One weekly session recovers most of what five daily ones provided, because her skill settles where practice balances decay, and a little well-designed practice tips that balance a long way.
The junior on the right of the figure starts with a 20 percent catch rate. Drafting monthly, she reaches about 36 percent after two years. With a weekly practice session, about 69. That's never-skilling in numbers: the experienced reviewer spends down savings, the junior never makes the deposit.
Now the uncomfortable part. None of this shows up anywhere. Missed errors are, by definition, unseen. Her approval rate goes up, her throughput goes up, and her manager sees a reliable process. The first evidence is a failure downstream, months later, blamed on the AI.
Her numbers improve while her judgment weakens. The first signal is a failure, months later, blamed on the machine.
Which skills to protect
Most people can no longer do long division quickly, and it doesn't matter. The calculator is almost never wrong, and a rough estimate catches the errors it makes. Three questions sort the cases where a faded skill does matter.
Will people need to act without the tool? A pilot has to fly when the autopilot drops out. An endoscopist works in rooms without the AI detector. If the answer is never, the faded skill costs little.
Does checking the tool's output require the faded skill? This is Bainbridge's irony as a question. Checking a calculator takes estimation, a much cheaper skill than computation. Checking a contract a model drafted, or code an agent wrote, takes much of the skill it took to produce them, because the errors that matter are the plausible ones. A model's wrong answers sound exactly like its right ones (Confidently Wrong).
How rare and how costly are the failures? Frequent failures keep people practiced and alert. Rare ones let skill and vigilance decay in between. Rare, expensive failures are the worst combination, and they're precisely what a well-functioning automated system produces.
Most office AI sits in the lower right of that grid. People rarely work without the tool, but judging its output needs the skill it replaced. The goal there is enough skill to judge, short of full skill to produce.
The calculator objection
The strongest objection: people said all this about calculators, spell-checkers and GPS. Teachers feared calculators would destroy arithmetic, and a 1986 review of 79 studies found that students using them alongside regular instruction kept or improved their pencil-and-paper skills at nearly every grade studied. Most of the time people adapt, and the skill that matters moves.
That's right about most skills a tool absorbs, and panic about each new technology has a poor track record. But look at why the calculator story worked. Calculators arrived alongside teaching that still covered arithmetic, and their failures, like a mistyped number, are caught by a rough estimate. Checking the tool didn't require the skill it replaced.
AI tools differ on exactly that condition. Their errors are plausible rather than obvious, because fluency is what training rewards. Their reliability is jagged: high on some tasks, low on neighbors that look similar. And the tasks they take over, drafting, analysis, code, diagnosis, are ones where checking needs most of the judgment it took to produce. A rough estimate catches a calculator's error. Nothing equivalent catches a subtly wrong legal argument.
So my position is selective. Where AI output can be checked cheaply by other means, tests that run, numbers that reconcile, a second independent source, the calculator story may well repeat, and the skill can shift to designing those checks. Where checking still depends on the skill being replaced, it won't repeat by itself. How fast skills fade over years of daily AI use, and how fast they come back, nobody has measured yet. That uncertainty argues for cheap insurance, not for waiting.
What to do
Write down the short list of skills you must keep. The ones needed to check the tool's output and to recover when it fails. Let the rest go deliberately, not by drift.
Schedule practice without the tool. Regulators asked airlines to make room for hand flying; Bainbridge suggested hands-on time each shift. In office work that means periodic independent work on real cases (draft the memo, write the function, run the analysis), compared afterwards with the AI's version, rotated so more than one person stays able to do it. The model above suggests the dose can be modest if it's regular and comes with feedback.
Configure tools to leave the hard part to the person when learning is the point. For training and new hires, a tool that gives hints instead of answers. In a 2026 experiment with developers learning a new code library, those who asked the assistant conceptual questions learned about as much as those who worked by hand, while those who delegated the coding learned least. It costs speed. Pay it where building the skill matters.
Ask for a judgment before showing the AI's answer. The mammography experiment shows how hard a suggestion pulls. Forming a view first keeps the skill in use and makes disagreement visible. It's slower, so use it on a sample or on the riskiest cases (Human Review Where It Matters).
Measure the reviewer, not only the tool. Seed a few known errors into the review queue and count how many get caught. That turns an invisible decline into a number someone can watch, the same logic as testing a model on your own work, applied to the person.
Give juniors the work that teaches, even when AI would be faster. Never-skilling is mostly an organizational choice. A firm can save money today by letting AI write the first drafts juniors used to write, and pay for it in five years when nobody can review the AI's drafts. Budget some junior work as training, and call it that.
Check yourself
Why did the radiologists' accuracy collapse when the suggestion was wrong?
People defer to a confident suggestion even when they are experts, and independent skill is what a tool that is usually right slowly stops exercising.
Why does the decline of a reviewer's skill go unnoticed?
Missed errors are unseen by definition, while her approval rate and throughput go up. The first evidence is a failure downstream, months later, blamed on the AI.
Why did the calculator story work out when the AI story may not?
Calculator errors are caught by a rough estimate, so checking didn't need the skill it replaced. AI errors are plausible, and checking drafting, analysis or code needs most of the judgment it took to produce them.
Notes, sources and method
For readers who want to check the numbers behind Skills That Fade When the Machine Does Them. Sources were checked on 18 October 2026.
Key numbers
| Number in the article | Exact value and context | Source and date |
|---|---|---|
| 27 radiologists, 50 mammograms, 12 with wrong suggestions; about 80% correct with right suggestions | With wrong suggestions: about 20% (inexperienced), 25% (moderately experienced), 46% (very experienced) | Dratsch et al., Radiology, 2023 [8] |
| Nearly 1,000 students; practice +48% (chatbot), +127% (hint tutor); exam −17% (chatbot), about the same (tutor) | Classroom-randomized, about fifty classes, four 90-minute sessions in fall 2023. Intention-to-treat coefficients on a normalized 0–100 grade: practice +13.7 points (95% interval 7.6 to 19.8) and +36.1 (29.8 to 42.4) against a no-AI mean of 28.4; exam −5.4 (−9.7 to −1.1) and −0.4 (−2.9 to +2.1) against 32.1 | Bastani et al., PNAS, 2025, Table 1 [10] |
| 16 airline pilots, 747 simulator | Boeing 747-400 simulator; manual control mostly intact; cognitive tasks degraded; associated with reported mind-wandering | Casner et al., Human Factors, 2014 [3] |
| Bainbridge, 1983 | "Ironies of Automation", Automatica | [1] |
| Reviewer model: 75% → 54% at six months → about 42% at two years; weekly practice about 70% | 46% at twelve months | Illustrative model, computed (see Method) |
| Second-year misses: 59 of 104 (monthly) against 26 (daily); 31 with weekly practice | Two subtle errors a week | Computed |
| Junior: 20% start; at 24 months 75% (daily), 36% (monthly), 69% (monthly plus weekly practice) | Computed | |
| Developers learning a new library (2026) | 52 mostly junior developers; AI group not significantly faster; about 4 points lower on a 27-point quiz (4.15; Cohen's d = 0.74); largest gap on debugging; those asking conceptual questions scored about as well as hand-coders (exploratory) | Shen and Tamkin, arXiv, January 2026 (v2 February 2026) [11] |
| Microsoft Research and Carnegie Mellon survey | 319 weekly users of generative AI, 936 task examples | Lee et al., CHI 2025 [12] |
| Calculators: 79 studies | Calculator use with traditional instruction maintained or improved paper-and-pencil skills at every grade level studied except grade four | Hembree and Dessart, 1986 [15] |
The bar chart of the classroom trial (a90-practice-versus-exam) was dropped from the article in the 19 Oct 2026 rewrite; its values are in this table. Percentages are each coefficient divided by the control-group mean (0.284 for practice, 0.321 for the exam), which reproduces the paper's 48%, 127% and 17%; the tutor exam estimate of −0.004 is −1.2% of the control mean and indistinguishable from zero. Intervals are the coefficient ± 1.96 classroom-clustered standard errors; dividing interval endpoints by the control mean ignores uncertainty in the mean, so percentage intervals are approximate.
Method and assumptions
The reviewer model is illustrative: the parameters are plausible assumptions, not estimates from data.
Each week the skill S (0 to 1) first decays toward a floor F: S ← F + (S − F)·e^(−λ), with λ = ln 2 / 26 for a 26-week (six-month) half-life. Then each practice session of effectiveness η closes that fraction of the remaining gap: S ← 1 − (1 − S)(1 − η). Ordinary drafting has η = 0.05; a deliberate practice session (drafting independently, then comparing with the AI's version and an expert's notes) has η = 0.10. Monthly drafting is applied as 12/52 of a session per week, an expected value. Detection of a subtle error is D = 0.8·S. The experienced reviewer starts at the steady state of daily drafting (S ≈ 0.94, F = 0.30); the junior starts at S = 0.25 with F = 0.20. About two subtle errors a week reach the reviewer.
Results at a 26-week half-life: experienced reviewer drafting daily, 75% detection throughout; drafting monthly, 54% at 6 months, 46% at 12 and 42% at 24; monthly plus a weekly deliberate session, 70%. Second-year misses: 26, 59 and 31 of 104. Junior at 24 months: 75% daily, 36% monthly, 69% with weekly practice.
Sensitivity. With a three-month half-life the monthly reviewer ends near 34%; with a one-year half-life, near 52%. The direction holds.
Left out: automation bias, which lowers attention independently of skill; any skill that reviewing itself builds (probably recognition more than production; Casner's results suggest engagement decides how much); differences in decay between overlearned skills and judgment; changes in which errors arrive as models improve. Code and full output are in the notes file.
The three questions and the grid (act without the tool; checking needs the skill; rare, costly failures) are a judgment, as is the placement of examples in the figure.
Caveats and open questions
Evidence by domain, with its limits:
- Aviation. In January 2013 the US Federal Aviation Administration issued SAFO 13002 after operational data showed an increase in manual handling errors; it says continuous autoflight use does not reinforce manual skills and encourages manual flying when workload is low. A 2013 joint industry and FAA working group reviewed 26 accidents; over 60% of the accident reports identified a manual handling error as a factor. It also noted that almost every group interviewed mentioned declining manual skills but few could show direct evidence, because data on manual skill is rarely collected, and it flagged pilots who might never build those skills. Air France flight 447 (June 2009, 228 dead) is often cited; the French investigators' final report (BEA, July 2012) lists many factors, including absent high-altitude manual-handling training, little exposure to stalls, startle, weakened task-sharing, display design and feedback processes. Reducing it to fading skill misreads the report; it does show automation handing control back in an unusual situation.
- Colonoscopy. Budzyń and colleagues (Lancet Gastroenterology & Hepatology, 2025) compared the adenoma detection rate in colonoscopies done without AI in the three months before and after four Polish centers introduced AI polyp detection: 28.4% (226 of 795) to 22.4% (145 of 648), a 6.0-point drop (95% CI 1.6 to 10.5); adjusted odds ratio 0.69 (0.53 to 0.89). It is a retrospective before-and-after comparison; other changes could contribute, and three months is short for skill to erode. A plausible reading is changed habits of attention, closer to automation bias than to lost knowledge.
- Classroom. One subject, one school, short-term outcomes, 2023-era models. Put to GPT Base ten times per problem, the students' most common request got a correct answer only 51% of the time, yet its errors did not carry over to matching exam problems, pointing to copying rather than learning wrong methods. The tutor's guardrails took real teacher effort.
- Programmers. The interaction-pattern analysis is exploratory, and the quiz came minutes after the task. Shen was in the Anthropic Fellows Program and Tamkin is at Anthropic, which sells AI coding tools.
- Knowledge workers. Self-reports from an online sample skewed young and technical: higher confidence in AI went with less reported critical thinking, and participants often skipped evaluation when they lacked the skill to inspect the output.
- Navigation and memory. Dahmani and Bohbot (2020): among 50 drivers, more lifetime GPS use went with worse spatial memory; of 13 retested three years later, heavier GPS use in between went with steeper decline. Small and correlational. The 2025 MIT Media Lab preprint "Your Brain on ChatGPT" (54 participants; 15 of 18 LLM users could not correctly quote their own essay in session 1, against 2 of 18 in each other group) is not peer reviewed and uses EEG connectivity as a stand-in for skill.
What the evidence does not show. Long-term effects are almost unmeasured; no study found tested professionals' unassisted performance at intervals over years of daily AI use. Whether a drop without the tool is lost knowledge or adapted attention is often unclear. Whether skill shift compensates (losing drafting skill, gaining verification skill) has not been measured in the same people. Recovery speed is unknown; Bjork's distinction predicts well-stored skills return quickly, which is a prediction, not a finding.
Automation bias affects experts as well as novices and is not prevented by training or instructions (Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010). The EU AI Act's human-oversight provision asks that overseers of high-risk systems remain aware of automation bias and be able to override the output.
What would change the conclusion. Long-term studies showing professionals using AI daily keep their unassisted performance, or recover it within days; evidence that checking can be learned without producing; verification tools that let non-experts catch subtle errors reliably; AI reliability high enough that failures become rare and cheap. Randomized workplace studies showing unassisted performance declining, or seeded-error detection falling among reviewers who stop producing, would strengthen it.
Sources
- Bainbridge, L. Ironies of Automation. Automatica 19(6), 775–779, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(83)90046-8 (text read from an open copy of the published PDF) — monitoring and take-over require the skills automation stops exercising; skills deteriorate with disuse; later generations may lack the skills; most reliable systems may need the most training; hands-on practice each shift or simulator practice.
- Bjork, E. L., Bjork, R. A. Making Things Hard on Yourself, But in a Good Way: Creating Desirable Difficulties to Enhance Learning. In Psychology and the Real World, Worth, 2011. https://bjorklab.psych.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2016/04/EBjork_RBjork_2011.pdf — storage versus retrieval strength; performance is not learning; desirable difficulties.
- Casner, S. M., Geven, R. W., Recker, M. P., Schooler, J. W. The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit. Human Factors 56(8), 1506–1516, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720814535628 — 16 airline pilots in a 747-400 simulator; manual control mostly intact, cognitive tasks of manual flight degraded, associated with task-unrelated thought.
- Federal Aviation Administration. SAFO 13002: Manual Flight Operations. 4 January 2013. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/SAFO13002.pdf — increase in manual handling errors; autoflight use does not reinforce manual skills; encourage manual flying when appropriate.
- Performance-based operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee and Commercial Aviation Safety Team, Flight Deck Automation Working Group. Operational Use of Flight Path Management Systems. Final report, September 2013. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/human_factors/OUFPMS_Report.pdf — 26 accidents reviewed; over 60% of accident reports cited a manual handling error; little direct data on manual skill; concern about pilots not developing skills.
- Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA). Final Report on the Accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203 Registered F-GZCP Operated by Air France, Flight AF 447 Rio de Janeiro–Paris. July 2012 (English edition). https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf (read from the Internet Archive copy of this URL) — sequence of events; causes and contributing factors, including absence of high-altitude manual handling training and of training in the unreliable-airspeed procedure.
- Parasuraman, R., Manzey, D. H. Complacency and Bias in Human Use of Automation: An Attentional Integration. Human Factors 52(3), 381–410, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720810376055 — automation bias in novices and experts, not prevented by training or instructions.
- Dratsch, T., Chen, X., Rezazade Mehrizi, M., et al. Automation Bias in Mammography: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence BI-RADS Suggestions on Reader Performance. Radiology 307(4), e222176, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1148/radiol.222176 — 27 radiologists, 50 mammograms, 12 with incorrect suggestions; accuracy with correct versus incorrect suggestions by experience level.
- Budzyń, K., Romańczyk, M., Kitala, D., et al. Endoscopist Deskilling Risk After Exposure to Artificial Intelligence in Colonoscopy: A Multicentre, Observational Study. Lancet Gastroenterology & Hepatology 10(10), 896–903, 2025 (correction published November 2025). https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-1253(25)00133-5 — four Polish centers; non-AI colonoscopy ADR 28.4% to 22.4%; odds ratio 0.69; retrospective observational design.
- Bastani, H., Bastani, O., Sungu, A., Ge, H., Kabakcı, Ö., Mariman, R. Generative AI Without Guardrails Can Harm Learning: Evidence From High School Mathematics. PNAS 122(26), e2422633122, 2025 (affiliation correction August 2025). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2422633122 — classroom-randomized trial, nearly 1,000 students; Table 1 coefficients; 51% correctness of GPT Base; copying mechanism; students' perceptions; stated limits.
- Shen, J. H., Tamkin, A. How AI Impacts Skill Formation. arXiv:2601.20245v2, February 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.20245 — 52 developers; no significant speedup; 4.15-point lower quiz score on 27 points (d = 0.738); largest gap on debugging; interaction patterns (exploratory). Shen in the Anthropic Fellows Program, Tamkin at Anthropic.
- Lee, H.-P., Sarkar, A., Tankelevitch, L., et al. The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking: Self-Reported Reductions in Cognitive Effort and Confidence Effects From a Survey of Knowledge Workers. CHI 2025. https://doi.org/10.1145/3706598.3713778 (author version: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/lee_2025_ai_critical_thinking_survey.pdf) — 319 workers, 936 examples; confidence effects; shift toward verification, integration and stewardship; limitations.
- Dahmani, L., Bohbot, V. D. Habitual Use of GPS Negatively Impacts Spatial Memory During Self-Guided Navigation. Scientific Reports 10, 6310, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-62877-0 — 50 drivers cross-sectional; 13 retested after three years.
- Kosmyna, N., Hauptmann, E., Yuan, Y. T., et al. Your Brain on ChatGPT: Accumulation of Cognitive Debt When Using an AI Assistant for Essay Writing Task. arXiv:2506.08872, June 2025 (v2 December 2025; preprint, no journal reference as of October 2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08872 — 54 participants, 18 in session 4; EEG connectivity; 15 of 18 LLM users unable to quote correctly in session 1; stated limitations.
- Hembree, R., Dessart, D. J. Effects of Hand-Held Calculators in Precollege Mathematics Education: A Meta-Analysis. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education 17(2), 83–99, 1986. https://doi.org/10.2307/749255 (ERIC record read) — 79 studies; calculator use with traditional instruction maintained or improved paper-and-pencil skills except in grade four.
- European Parliament and Council. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act), Article 14(4)(a)–(b). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj — overseers able to understand capacities and limitations and to remain aware of automation bias.